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1. Divisions in theology: Notes towards a Philosophical 
Theology
a. The Anti-Modern Slant
‘Only theology overcomes metaphysics.’ This is John Milbank’s conclusion 
in a chapter bearing that very same title in his book The Word Made 
Strange. Theology, he there writes,
If it wishes to think again God’s love, and think creation as the 
manifestation of that love, ... must entirely evacuate philosophy, 
which is metaphysics, leaving it nothing (outside imaginary worlds, 
logical implications or the isolation of aporias) to either do or see, 
which is not – manifestly, I judge – malicious.1
Based on the content of the rest of the chapter, it is important to note 
that Milbank does not suggest disconnecting theology entirely from all 
philosophy. Philosophy, he argues, serves a purpose as long as it is oriented 
towards ‘an always in any case implicit abstract reflection on the “context” 
of our ascent’. By this, he means a philosophy that is able to ‘convert the 
given into a gift, to receive love’ and to ‘admit the mediation of appearing 
and revelation via the judgement and right desire of “the inspired man”, 
even if it be equally the case that judgement and right desire are themselves 
entirely given’.2 And he adds that he is referring to a concept of revelation 
 1 John Milbank, The Word Made Strange: Theology, Language, Culture (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1997) pp. 36–52 (50).
 2 Milbank, The Word Made Strange, p. 49.
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which dates prior to early modernity, after which it became ‘distorted’ into 
a positive, actual content.3
 Coming to a different conclusion but also referring to a premodern 
conception of faith, John Caputo has argued that theology and philosophy 
are closely connected insofar as they are inwardly structured by the sort of 
faith that is at work in each. He claims that:
[Faith] turns out to have a stronger hand to play, which is why ... the 
premoderns were onto something important. For faith is an elemental 
form of human life, a basic ingredient in our existence, as necessary as 
the air we breathe, and it proves to be an indispensable requirement 
for philosophy as well as for theology, which it turns out differ from 
each other in virtue of the difference between the faith that is in them, 
that is in each of them.4
Caputo concludes that the distinction between philosophy and theology is 
between two kinds of interpretative angles on faith, which is a given that 
both the philosopher and the theologian have in common.
 Milbank’s analysis of a rigid separation of modern philosophy and 
theology has radical consequences for his critique of theological reason and 
for the recognition of theological sources in particular. The givenness of 
judgement contradicts, according to him, the possibility of an independent 
phenomenology that could inform theology or even evoke new theological 
content. Theology therefore, he concludes, should resist metaphysics and 
avoid resulting in representational knowledge, but instead continue to 
be susceptible to the infinite source that has shaped the history of human 
ascent. Caputo claims that this infinite source is already and always present 
in metaphysical and representational knowledge, which are therefore not 
opposed to receiving the gift of the divine, but instead are the interpretative 
results of it.
 Milbank however argues that only theological judgement participates 
in that which is given from this infinite source, and in order to maintain 
that participation, it should remain non-metaphysical through the active 
response to the givenness of the ongoing history it is part of. He considers 
modern philosophy however as being ‘metaphysical’ and positivist. He 
defines it as rooted in the secular immanentism of ancient philosophy, which 
forces it to seek a graspable, immanent security. Hence, it is unsuitable 
for theology. Theological judgement in turn is described by Milbank as 
 3 In the chapter ‘Theology overcomes metaphysics’, Milbank expresses an adamant 
opposition to the philosophy of Jean-Luc Marion, claiming that Marion’s position 
leads to asserting the truth of Christianity merely on the level of appearance, without 
giving any account of revelation as a historical continuity.
 4 John D. Caputo, Philosophy and Theology (Nashville, TN: Abingdon, 2006) 
pp. 57–58.
IMPLICIT FAITH
211
revealed judgement, and he disqualifies modernity for its misrepresentation 
of revelation as being co-constructible through knowledge and language, 
which according to him results in viewing the world, at its best, as ‘a series 
of givens to be known, rather than gifts to be received and returned’. In 
short, according to Milbank, theological judgement is and should remain 
non-phenomenological, non-metaphysical and should be considered as 
revealed. Consequently, he argues, it cannot take its sources from modern 
philosophy or any cultural or social practice whatsoever, but instead it 
originates from and seeks its way to, what he describes as a pure form of 
theologia.
 And yet, why is it that this theological origin should not be reflected 
upon with the help of modern philosophy? I would here like to argue 
against anti-modern and ‘neo-orthodox’ positions such as Milbank’s. 
Resisting or resigning to the use of modern philosophy in contemporary 
theology unnecessarily leads to the division of theologians into so-called 
orthodox or revisionist and liberal camps. Dividing philosophical and 
theological schools into ‘premodern’, ‘modern’ and ‘postmodern’ groups is 
the result of modern philosophy itself and it does not do justice to a chrono-
logical description of the history of philosophy. Moreover, confirming 
these divisions involves a diversion from theology’s core business, which 
is to reflect on God’s salvific act in history.5 School divisions in contem-
porary philosophy and theology are not very helpful to the furtherance of 
theological reflection and frequently result in methodological debates about 
the relationship between disciplines or cultural periods.6
b. The Modern Angle
Through a rereading of Edward Schillebeeckx’s theological metaphysics, I 
would like to show that contemporary theology can be the fruitful outcome 
of an ongoing conversation and connection of faith with modern philosophy. 
In my opinion, Schillebeeckx’s application of a Kantian interpretation of an 
Aristotelian-Thomist metaphysics to modern theology is a clear example of 
this. Theologians should continue that conversation instead of presenting 
themselves as opponents of the modern. This is not only needed for reasons 
of analytics and academic or secular communication, as David Tracy 
suggested by distinguishing theology’s audiences, in which philosophy 
 5 Cf. John Webster, ‘Theology after Liberalism’, Theology after Liberalism: Classical 
and Contemporary Readings (ed. John Webster and George P. Schner; Blackwell 
Readings in Modern Theology; Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), pp. 52–64; John Webster, 
‘Theologies of Retrieval’, The Oxford Handbook of Systematic Theology (ed. John 
B. Webster, Kathryn E. Tanner and Iain R. Torrance; Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007), pp. 583–99.
 6 Cf. Ingolf Ulrich Dalferth, Theology and Philosophy (repr.; Eugene, OR: Wipf & 
Stock, 2001).
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served as a rhetorical tool to reinforce theology’s accountability within the 
academy.7 Apart from the formal support that philosophy adds to the study 
of faith, I would like to claim that it is perfectly capable of reflecting on the 
material content of theology without ‘maliciously distorting’ it, as Milbank 
suggests. Instead, philosophy adds to or complements theology, precisely 
because, as Caputo claimed, it is motivated by the faith that has shaped 
both philosophy and theology.
 A counterproposal to current neo-orthodox tendencies in philosophy 
and theology is the further development of a philosophical theology, which 
distinguishes but neither identifies nor separates practices of the given 
faith from its traditional and tradition-bound resources, discourses and 
worldviews. One of the distinctions theologians should particularly reflect 
upon nowadays is that between secular worldviews and the world of faith. 
Philosophy, like other academic disciplines applied to theology, is needed 
to make these distinctions. Instead of evacuating philosophy from theology 
in order to uncover a ‘pure’ theological centre of judgement, I would like 
to propose that philosophy is actively involved in discovering and forming 
constructive judgements of faith, and in understanding what constitutes 
theology as theology. The latter does not entail understanding revelation 
as an added, authoritative or decisive theological argument against an 
otherwise nihilist modernism. Here, Milbank’s criticism of theology as a 
type of representational knowledge could equally be applied to a certain 
brand of authoritative traditionalism or positivism of revelation. Instead, 
philosophy adds to the (re)discovery and understanding of revelation as 
the actual, here and now dynamics of the divine Word in the world, also, 
and perhaps even especially there and then, where it is not or not fully 
confirmed as such, if only for acknowledging the experience that when it 
is confirmed or represented, it points at the particular contingency of its 
representation, rather than at the universality of its infinite source.8 What 
we need to explore therefore, is implicit faith, at least in order to under-
stand why more or less explicit forms of faith are inadequate or valuable. 
But also, from a Christian perspective, to understand why the contingency 
of life and the real is not an absolute limit, but ever anew susceptible to the 
revelatory event of the incarnation in Christ.9
 7 David Tracy, The Analogical Imagination: Christian Theology and the Culture of 
Pluralism (Ann Arbor, MI: Crossroad, 1981).
 8 Cf. Edward Schillebeeckx, Church: The Human Story of God (trans. John Bowden; 
New York, NY: Crossroad, 1990) pp. 72–77.
 9 Cf. Schillebeeckx, Church, pp. 27–28.
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2. Understanding Being: De Petter’s Theory of the 
Implicit Intuition
Which phenomenology and which metaphysics could provide the 
material for the exploration of an ‘implicit faith’?10 According to 
Schillebeeckx himself, in twentieth-century Catholic theology, the choice 
was between the metaphysics of either Joseph Maréchal or Dominique 
De Petter, who was Schillebeeckx’s philosophy teacher.11 Both developed 
post-neothomist ontologies closely connected with modern epistemology. 
Maréchal argued that the validity of abstract concepts is founded on 
a non-intellectual dynamic of the mind. Knowledge then, is considered 
a projective act in which the concept transcends itself towards the 
infinite.12 Maréchal’s metaphysics is based on Kantian epistemology, 
which denies the possibility of knowing the Ding an sich. The Ding an 
sich functions merely as the transcendental limit of knowledge. De Petter 
criticized Maréchal for finding a solution for the antinomy of concept 
and reality outside the intellectual act itself, and ultimately denying true 
knowledge of reality itself. Although Maréchal tries to bridge the gap 
between reason and reality through a transcendental dynamic of the 
mind, he needs a non-intellectual patch to do so. De Petter, in turn, 
proposed to found his realist metaphysics on an intellectual act: ‘implicit 
 10 See also: Jeffrey D. Bloechl, Religious Experience and the End of Metaphysics (The 
Indiana Series in the Philosophy of Religion; Bloomington IN: Indiana University 
Press, 2003); Hermann Deuser (ed.), Metaphysik und Religion: Die Wiederentdeckung 
eines Zusammenhanges (Veröffentlichungen der Wissenschaftlichen Gesellschaft für 
Theologie; Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 2007).
 11 The Swiss theologian Hans Urs von Balthasar presented the choice for a theological 
metaphysics as one between Kant or Goethe. According to him, Rahner, following 
Maréchal, chose Kant and Balthasar himself chose Goethe. Cf. Michael Albus, ‘Geist 
und Feuer: Ein Gesprach mit Hans Urs Von Balthasar’, Herder Korrespondenz 30 
(1976), pp. 72–82 (76).
 12 Cf. Karl Rahner, Hearers of the Word (rev. Johann Baptist Metz; trans. Ronald 
Walls; London/Sydney: Sheed and Ward, 1969) p. 59:
Consciousness grasps its particular object in a pre-concept of being (as we 
wish to designate this process of reaching out to grasp the ‘more’) and hence 
of the absolute breadth of its possible objects. In each particular cognition 
it always reaches out beyond the particular object, and thus grasps it, not 
just as its unrelated, dead ‘thisness,’ but in its limitation and reference to the 
totality of all possible objects. This is because consciousness, by being close 
to the particular in order to know it, also always reached out beyond the 
particular as such. The pre-concept is the condition for the possibility of the 
universal concept, of the abstraction which in turn is what makes possible 
the objectification of the datum of sense perception and so of conscious 
subsisting-in-oneself.
EDWARD SCHILLEBEECKX AND CONTEMPORARY THEOLOGY
214
intuition’.13 My proposal for the exploration of implicit faith resonates 
with the title of De Petter’s article, ‘Implicit Intuition’.14 In it, De Petter 
tries to conquer the critical problem, that is, the antinomy of concept 
and reality. In this section I will offer a reconstruction of De Petter’s 
metaphysics and clarify the philosophical background of Schillebeeckx’s 
theology and my own thoughts towards a theology of implicit faith.15
a. Being Constitutes the Intellect, but the Intuition of Being is Intellectual
‘Implicit intuition’, as De Petter defines it, is the direct intellectual grasping 
of the concrete. ‘Intuition’, therefore, should not be understood as a sudden, 
accidental insight, which at best can be trained as if it is a certain type of 
sensibility or something to which one can ‘open one’s mind’. Nor should it 
be understood as a preparatory phase, from which all knowledge develops. 
Implicit intuition is not a pre-reflexive given either, which precedes active 
and conscious knowledge. It is however performed by the intellect, De 
Petter claims, while, on the other hand, implicit intuition enables the intel-
lectual act to be a true grasping of reality. Therefore, implicit intuition is not 
an epistemic characteristic that is present in the intellect. It is a condition 
for knowledge that needs to be realized by the act of knowledge itself. This 
is why implicit intuition is not a warranty, serving thus as a coping-stone 
for a naive realist philosophy. The intellect and the abstract concepts it 
forms, play an essential part in the act called implicit intuition. Implicit 
intuition is ‘a moment of intuition which is essentially included in the intel-
lectual act, from which it has received its most essential meaning and in 
which it could be discovered through reflective effort’.16
 De Petter’s set-up for a Kantian influenced, but nevertheless realist 
metaphysics is an attempt to conquer every dualism between the knowing 
subject and the known object, despite the difference between reality’s 
concrete particularities and the intellect’s abstract and necessarily unifying 
constructions. According to him, both concrete particularity and abstract 
 13 Cf. Edward Schillebeeckx, The Concept of Truth and Theological Renewal (trans. 
N.D. Smith; Theological Soundings, 1/2; London/Sydney: Sheed and Ward, 1968) 
pp. 18–22.
 14 Dominicus Maria De Petter, ‘Impliciete intuïtie’, Tijdschrift voor Philosophie 1 
(1939), pp. 84–105.
 15 For an English interpretation of De Petter’s metaphysics, see Philip Kennedy, Deus 
Humanissimus: The Knowability of God in the Theology of Edward Schillebeeckx 
(Ökumenische Beihefte zur Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie, 
22; Fribourg: Universitäts-Verlag, 1993); cf. also: Robert J. Schreiter, ‘Edward 
Schillebeeckx’, The Modern Theologians: An Introduction to Christian Theology in 
the Twentieth Century (ed. David F. Ford; Oxford/Cambridge: Blackwell, 2nd edn, 
1997), pp. 152–61.
 16 De Petter, ‘Impliciete intuïtie’, pp. 101–02.
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construction are an expression of the unity of being, which in turn is 
also the most fundamental and constitutive unity of the intellect, albeit 
implicitly and inadequately expressed in abstract concepts. This inadequacy 
however, he argues, is a characteristic of the concept and the intellect, not 
of the unity of being itself.
 In short, De Petter argues that implicit intuition is an indispensable 
aspect of the intellectual act. This aspect only becomes explicit in the 
formation of knowledge through abstract concepts, which are expressions 
of truth, a truth that always presupposes the unity of being. Being is implied 
in the abstract expression, whereas the abstraction in itself cannot express 
this being. A concept is called abstract, because it does not encompass 
concreteness. In relation to the concrete, abstraction is forever imperfect. It 
is imperfect compared to complete unity, that is, the unity through which 
the abstract and the concrete can be understood together in their singularity 
of being. De Petter claims that this singularity of being or unity of being 
is the constitutive foundation of the unity of knowledge (truth), which 
is forever implicitly and non-conceptually implied in the intellect which 
makes itself explicit. This can only become clear through the activity of the 
intellect itself, when it expresses itself through the act of judgement and the 
formation of abstract concepts.
 The being that is expressed with the abstract concept, guarantees the 
objectivity of the concept, De Petter stipulates. The abstraction has to be 
integrated into an ontological consciousness, because the unity of concept 
and reality is performed by the intellect, not by the abstract concept itself. 
The human mind can only form these concepts because of this ontological 
consciousness that is implied in the intellect. The realization of the inade-
quacy of the abstract concept diffusely explains how the abstract concept 
is the expression of an intellectual identity. Through this realization of 
the difference between the ontological consciousness and the abstracting 
intellect, the intellect finds the explanation for this difference in itself. This 
is the full meaning of the term ‘implicitness’.17
b. The Judgement is Real, Intuitive and Intellectual
Abstract expression is part of an explicit judgement which lays claim to the 
epistemic truth because of its movement from the abstract to the concrete. 
Yet De Petter questions how this movement is possible. The abstraction 
itself cannot complete the movement into the concrete. This, he claims, is 
only possible because of an implicit moment in the expression. In principle, 
this implicitness is identical in the judgement and the concept, but in the 
judgement (e.g. A is B), only that which is implied by the abstraction is to 
some extent made explicit by means of the copula ‘is’. However, the copula 
 17 De Petter, ‘Impliciete intuïtie’, pp. 86–87.
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‘is’ can only function as the bridge between the abstract and the concrete if, 
apart from the standard copulative value, it is also given a judicative value. 
After all, if the term ‘being’ denotes the implicit consciousness of being, 
this term has a judicative value, because, according to De Petter, only the 
consciousness of being has the objective value of judgement.
 A judgement therefore is not merely conceptual, but it also consists of a 
retracing of the abstract content to a concrete reality. The act of abstraction 
does not include the concreteness of the actual being, however. Therefore, 
to be meaningful, a judgement consists of a supplementary act by which 
the abstract content of a judgement is traced back to concrete reality. The 
structure of a judgement corresponds to that particular function: It consists 
of a predicate, as that which has to be traced back to the concrete; and 
a copula, as that which brings about the tracing. Now that the meaning 
and the function of a judgement have been defined as a supplement to the 
abstraction, it needs to be explained how a judgement connects the abstract 
content with the concrete. This is the question regarding the foundation of 
a judgement, to which the answer can be found in the moment of intuition 
of a judgement.
 The solution of traditional Thomist philosophy for the problem of 
reaching the concrete from the abstract by means of a judgement is 
untenable, according to De Petter. This solution is the conversio ad 
phantasmata, i.e. reaching the concrete through a judgement by means of a 
reflection on the contents of sensory perception on which the abstractions 
are dependent. De Petter questions whether it can be taken for granted 
that, because of the dependence of the abstractions upon sensory contents, 
a judgement could retrace those sensory contents in the abstract concept, 
and in doing so, reach the concrete again. For De Petter’s rigid realism, the 
act of the imagination is no option for connecting a judgement with the 
particular. The intellect cannot grasp concreteness in any other quality than 
that which is characteristic to it, that is, its intelligibility. The antinomy of 
the peculiar function of a judgement, of connecting the abstract and the 
concrete, is replaced by an antinomy of the sensory and the intellectual. 
Sensory perception does not grasp the concrete as concreteness. Although 
it experiences it as concreteness, the objectivity of an object can only be 
grasped by the intellect. Sensory perception however has to be regarded as a 
link between the concrete and the intellect, for how else would the intellect 
be able to define the function of sensory perception as a full experience of 
concreteness if it was not able to fully grasp concreteness itself, through the 
sensory perception?
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c. The Intuition is not Transcendental but Manifests Being as the Act of 
God
Because of the conceptual unity, which the transcendental contents (being, 
one, thingness, etc.) of a judgement maintain in relation to the concrete, it 
has become clear that these transcendental contents are not interchangeable 
with implicit intuition itself. After all, implicit intuition itself has no 
conceptual unity and is therefore never expressed in the abstract concept. 
Intuition is the implicit expression of transcendental concepts in judge-
ments and abstract concepts. With regard to the transcendental content, 
implicit intuition is the possibility of its functioning. This is how De Petter 
distinguishes intuition in the abstraction from the intuition in the transcen-
dental contents of judgement. With regard to the abstraction, it functions as 
a way of reaching the concrete, whereas with regard to the transcendental 
contents it functions as the way in which the abstraction is able to reach 
the concrete.
 According to De Petter, being is a pure act. By ‘being’, he means the 
fundamental constitutive act of the consciousness of being by which 
the intellect intrinsically and totally performs itself and forms the basic 
principle of its activity and self-realization. Being is not a static condition, 
but an ever-changing current of events and relations. Yet, metaphysical 
unity expressed by the term ‘being’ is a unity that is present in the fluid 
reality of the multiple, individual beings; even if it is a unity which can only 
be established in metaphysical reflection, as a principle for structuring, used 
by the human intellect in reality. Although the unity present in multiplicity 
can only be found by means of philosophical reflection and is not part of 
a spontaneous and explicit knowledge, this does not mean that it is only a 
metaphysical concept – that is, only used logically and formally – and not 
something which is present in reality. According to De Petter, metaphysical 
unity is being as act. The act of knowledge implicitly confirms its own 
foundation, as being itself. Being as such is not the quod of the act of 
knowledge, but the quo, the internal principle from which every conceptual 
expression derives its intellectual meaning and value.
 In the last section of his article, De Petter identifies the unity of being 
with God, and the implicit intuition with the divine act that is pure intellect 
in itself. Without any sufficient explanation, De Petter concludes his article 
by saying that his theory of the implicit intuition shows the necessary 
complementary value of the Augustinian doctrine of illumination to the 
Aristotelian-Thomist doctrine of knowledge.18 What else, he wonders, 
could manifest itself so completely in inadequate beings that create equally 
inadequate abstract concepts? And it is this supplementary statement that 
is unaccounted for, which would probably raise Milbank’s attention, since 
 18 De Petter, ‘Impliciete intuïtie’, pp. 103–04.
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it comes so close to his own correction of Thomist metaphysics with an 
Augustinian Neo-Platonism.
3. Understanding Faith: Schillebeeckx’s Speculative 
Theology
a. Anticipation against Participation
In the first volume of the trilogy on Christology, Schillebeeckx explicitly 
dissociated himself from De Petter’s theory of implicit intuition. According 
to him, this type of metaphysics leaves no space for history and time, 
and for that matter, no space for context. The answer, he writes, to the 
Christological question of whether God’s salvific acts are present in 
Jesus of Nazareth, should be demonstrable in historical experiences. He 
himself regards this as a clear break with De Petter and even with Thomas 
Aquinas. He argues that Aquinas was able to confirm the implicit partici-
pation of the totality of being in each and every particular experience 
and each and every separate abstract expression as self-evident, because 
it was also a socio-cultural reality, and therefore part of people’s experi-
ences there and then. Schillebeeckx believes however that in a secularized 
society that offers different religious options, the idea of participation that 
lies behind the metaphysics of the implicit intuition needs to be replaced 
by the idea of anticipation, so as to recognize that being is becoming in 
history. Consequently, Schillebeeckx adds, every universal truth claim will 
have to justify itself to critical reason, to which it can only present itself 
as a hypothesis: ‘Being able to demonstrate the personal, socio-political, 
secular, historical relevance of the Christian faith (within a critical stance 
towards society and culture) thus becomes an indirect test of religious, 
faith-motivated utterances.’19
 Schillebeeckx’s Christology would therefore involve a clear break with 
the metaphysics of unity of his fellow Dominican and philosophical teacher 
De Petter, but also with that of Thomas Aquinas, and this for philosophical 
and social-cultural reasons. At this point, one could wonder whether 
Schillebeeckx has allowed contextuality and culture to fully determine and 
change the metaphysical foundations of (his) theology, or at least, the way 
in which he justifies the relation between the context and the content of 
faith. In the first part of his last monograph Church: The Human Story 
of God, where he meditates on the word ‘God’ and the experiences it 
expresses and produces, Schillebeeckx describes philosophical reflection on 
God as a ‘distant context’ in which people use the word ‘God’. According 
 19 Edward Schillebeeckx, Jesus: An Experiment in Christology (trans. Hubert Hoskins; 
New York, NY: Seabury, 1979) p. 619.
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to him, philosophical traditions used to be rational and theoretical explo-
rations of a presupposed belief in God. In this sense, he argues, it must be 
acknowledged that religions are the primary contexts of the use of the word 
‘God’. So, Schillebeeckx’s pluralist concerns in his last book not only apply 
to religious traditions’ internal differences or differences between religious 
traditions, but also to the difference of contexts in which philosophy and 
theology emerge.20
 Should it be acknowledged, after De Petter’s attack on a Thomist 
epistemology, and after Schillebeeckx’s criticism of unifying metaphysical 
systems of participation and his recognition of philosophy emerging from 
a context different from theology, that we are far removed from Thomist 
philosophy as a foundation or natural conversation partner for theology?21 
Is this the consequence of Schillebeeckx’s anticipation for the challenges 
for contemporary theology: religious pluralism, nonfoundationalism and 
postmodern thought, and the attention given to otherness, difference, 
absence, and historicity?22 Like nonfoundationalists and postmodern 
thinkers, Schillebeeckx seems to reject metaphysics or first philosophies in 
favour of historical experience. Is therefore Milbank’s criticism valid here, 
that these challenges have led to the confirmation of the world as a series of 
givens to be known, rather than gifts to be received and returned? Is there 
no independent phenomenology or type of metaphysics that could incor-
porate history and particular experiences into a theology that reflectively 
returns these gifts?
 I would like to propose that for answering these questions, both the 
philosophy of De Petter and the theology of Schillebeeckx will prove to be 
most helpful, and indeed, in doing so, I am implying that I disagree with 
Schillebeeckx on his radical break with his philosophy teacher, although 
I do acknowledge their differences in language and focus as significant. 
But more importantly, rereading De Petter and Schillebeeckx from the 
perspective of contemporary theology could offer some tools for my explo-
rations into implicit faith.
 First, let us return to De Petter’s metaphysics. His stress on the 
performance of the intellect as a necessity for being to appear as the impli-
cation of every judgement, is thoroughly historical. He does not claim 
that the intellect constructs being as such, nor does he support the type of 
phenomenology which claims that without the performing transcendental 
 20 Cf. Schillebeeckx, Church, Chapter 1.
 21 Despite the strong analytical Thomist tradition in contemporary theology, see, 
for instance, John Haldane, Faithful Reason: Essays Catholic and Philosophical 
(London/New York, NY: Routledge, 2004) pp. 3-15; and Fergus Kerr, After Aquinas: 
Versions of Thomism (Malden, MA/Oxford: Blackwell, 2002) pp. 74–76.
 22 Cf. Thomas G. Guarino, Foundations of Systematic Theology (Theology for the 
Twenty-First Century; New York: T&T Clark, 2005) pp. 1–39.
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subject, there is no being, because being by definition would be being-for-
me. On the contrary, De Petter advocates a strong realism, without claiming 
that being as being is fully available in concepts or judgements, although 
it needs the intellect’s performance to understand that the totality of being 
lies at the origin of every intellectual act. Intellectual judgement reveals its 
origin by being inadequate and diffuse, in other words, by implying that 
which it cannot reveal through its performance of grasping the real.23 In 
De Petter’s later works, he expresses a strong aversion to the concept of the 
esse commune, precisely because it ignores the historicity of the performing 
intellect. The contingency of beings, he claims, defies a confirmation of their 
unity, and the experience of their contingency can only negatively point at 
a unity that is absolute and fully transcendent.
 It is this last statement that led to Schillebeeckx’s conclusion that De 
Petter’s metaphysics is a metaphysics of participation, which offers a 
worldview founded on a concept of absolute Being, and is undesirable for 
a contemporary culture in which the pluralism and historicity of events 
and ideas should be confirmed rather than transcendentally grounded. 
But Schillebeeckx himself, in contrast with his own criticism of De Petter’s 
metaphysics, has been perfectly capable of combining a metaphysics of 
participation and a theology of historical experience.
b. Speculative Theology
To demonstrate this, I would like to point toward two moments in 
Schillebeeckx’s historical development, one in his early years and one in 
his later years. Both moments signify his own struggle with a metaphysical 
ambivalence that is integral to every experience of practiced faith, and 
which has led to reflexive forms of both positive and speculative theology. 
In the collection of articles in Revelation and Theology, Schillebeeckx 
defines positive theology as seeking insight into the development of 
revelation in the scriptures and the mystery of Christ into dogmatic 
theology.24 According to him, a necessary condition for understanding this 
development is the reconstruction of historical experiences of salvation and 
the communal, ecclesial life that it shaped. This reconstruction however 
makes use of a reason that is illuminated by faith and allied with the history 
of faith. Neither the illumination of reason nor the historical continuity can 
be part of magisterial teaching alone, he argues, but should be performed 
 23 Cf. David Tracy, ‘On Longing: The Void, the Open, God’, Longing in a Culture 
of Cynicism (ed. Stephan van Erp and Lea Verstricht; Zürich/Berlin: LIT, 2008), 
pp. 15–32.
 24 On ‘positive theology’, see: Edward Schillebeeckx, Revelation and Theology (trans. 
N.D. Smith; Theological Soundings, 1/1; London/Melbourne: Sheed and Ward, 
1967) pp. 118–23.
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by speculative theology. Speculative thought continues to intellectually 
regenerate the connection of present day experiences with scripture and 
tradition. Apart from furthering the knowledge of faith through a reflection 
on the cohesion of the mysteries of faith and through the reconstruction 
of historical theological developments, speculative theology could also 
discursively rethink positive statements. But it should at the same time not 
overstate its demand of intelligibility. And he concludes:
Theology is always a ‘stammering’ in the face of the transcendent 
mystery of faith ... this humility [ought to be] not merely a question of 
words, but also something that must be apparent in the manner in which 
theology is practised. The attention of theology must always be directed 
to the mystery of salvation that is announced and not to the human 
means which help us to approach it. ... In the content of faith there is 
both a tendency towards incarnation in human thought and a funda-
mental resistance to rationalisation. On the one hand, theology should 
not sink into so-called ‘evangelism’, which is only aware of the mystery 
and the ‘folly of faith’, nor should it tend towards an uncontrolled 
incarnation, which is only conscious of the meaningful intelligibility 
of faith. ... Sound theology can only develop if it progresses diffidently 
between this Scylla and that Charybdis. It must actively maintain a 
constant tension between incarnation and disincarnation, between 
transcendence and humanising. ... the harmonious relationship between 
the impulse towards incarnation and disincarnation, at the level of 
theological thought, only come[s] about dramatically in conflicts and 
polemics, between stern excommunications and splendid syntheses. 
Throughout history, therefore theology is always passing through a 
crisis or growth, as a result of which its true face is always appearing in 
a purer form ‘until we all attain to the unity of the faith’ (Eph 4:13).25
c. Mystical Theology
In Church, Schillebeeckx develops a mystical theology based on the notion 
of an ‘absolute limit’, of a radical finitude and contingency, which resonates 
with his balancing of speculative and positive theology, but also with 
his theory of the anthropological constants as theological foundations.26 
Both believers and non-believers, he acknowledges, share the experience 
of a radical finitude and contingency. By this, he hastens to add, he is not 
referring to situations in which people find themselves when they are most 
vulnerable, for example, when they are seriously ill or dying. (Schillebeeckx’s 
concept of the ‘contrast experience’ is sometimes wrongly interpreted as 
 25 Schillebeeckx, Revelation and Theology, pp. 176–77.
 26 Schillebeeckx, Church, pp. 77–80.
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such, as if it only occurs during or after certain dramatic events.) Neither 
is the experience of the absolute limit the same as Schleiermacher’s 
schlechthinniges Abhängigkeitsgefühl, as it is not an immediate revelatory 
experience, a deep insight of some sorts. On the contrary, the experience of 
the absolute limit is given within every human experience as real. As the 
real in human experience, it refers to something that is not a by-product of 
experience, but to the implied confirmation of reality in every experience. 
Here, we find clear traces of De Petter’s implicit intuition in the work of the 
later Schillebeeckx. The latter however moves from the epistemological to 
the theological. It is at the absolute limit that all religious and secular world-
views emerge, he continues. The modern view of religion as the choice to 
create another world, a supernature beyond limits of the secular, is misrep-
resenting religious interpretations of this experience, as if religion, contrary 
to secular worldviews, does not do justice to contingency, but instead 
contradicts it with the escape to a transcendent reality outside the limit 
of finitude. Yet, there is, according to Schillebeeckx, a difference between 
religious and secular worldviews, in as far as the believer interprets the limit 
as a salvific divine presence in history, while the non-believer is ‘locked up 
within the absolute limit, lonely with fellow human beings’.
 Twenty years after Schillebeeckx wrote this, it may not be that easy to 
distinguish between believers and non-believers. In Western Europe and 
America, secularization has been followed by a cultural trend that some 
describe as the resurgence of religion. This does not mean that secular 
worldviews are diminishing. Instead, secular views mediate religious views, 
and not seldom implicitly or in language and forms that are yet to be recog-
nized as religious. I am not just referring to the grey area of those ideas and 
rituals of people who are exploring forms of spirituality both old and new. 
Nor am I pointing at the so-called religious market in pluralist or multi-
cultural societies. Instead, I think this is a time and an age to acknowledge 
new ways in which people with secular worldviews are associated with 
the history of an incarnate God, and are therefore connected with the 
people in the church. Theologians should explore the implicit associations 
and connections of contemporary secular culture with its religious past 
and present. This would not only serve the purpose of understanding the 
ongoing reform of churches and theologies or the appeal of conversions to 
Christianity, as Charles Taylor has done in his A Secular Age.27 It would 
also make explicit what otherwise could be easily overlooked: the implicit 
faith in a divine and salvific presence in history.
 With the support of philosophy, theology should be the study of the 
experiences at the absolute limit, asking why some believe or decide that 
the limit confronts them with a divine presence in the world and why some 
 27 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press/Harvard University 
Press, 2007) pp. 728–72.
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do not. Moreover, theology’s new task is one of description and under-
standing at the limits of contingency, seeking to comprehend both where 
and how the hopes and fears that people share assist in constructing their 
worldviews. At first sight, these constructions appear as the reassembly of 
the remnants of communities in history of which future generations may 
or may not be part. To be able to discover newness in that reassembly, 
however, it might prove necessary to disconnect positive from speculative 
theology, temporarily, for the sake of a specific type of descriptive explo-
ration, a phenomenology of practiced faith in places where it is as yet not 
expected to appear. Schillebeeckx’s mystical theology of the absolute limit 
thus points toward new tasks for contemporary theology: understanding 
the beliefs of non-believers as a different outcome of shared experiences at 
the absolute limit of contingency and exploring implicit faith in a world full 
of meaning, shared by believers and non-believers alike.
Conclusion
One of theology’s philosophical tasks – and philosophy’s tasks for theology 
– is to speculatively search for and articulate an actual and ongoing incar-
nation of the divine in the world, in order to retrace and confirm theologia 
before it has become theology, which in its turn can only reflectively confess 
it, but certainly not speak it. Thus, it opens the possibility of an unexpected 
locus theologicus: implicit faith moves between the Scylla of revelation 
and tradition as imposed or exclusive theological foundations, and the 
Charybdis of culture and context as providers of ever-new theological 
embodiments. Modern philosophy, as the expression of, and reflection on 
worldviews, could well prove to be a carrier of implicit faith and one of the 
mediators of the passivum theologicum, as Schillebeeckx has discussed it.28 
Although the passivum theologicum signifies expressions of the remnants 
of a religious past, it may also provide the material for composing a 
future of hope. I have argued that phenomenology, metaphysics, or any 
form of speculative philosophy should not be ignored or excluded from 
constructive theology. Against Milbank, who has suggested that the present 
needs a theology proper, a positivist theological metaphysics of the gift, I 
have argued that the speculative and the mystical are needed to explore 
implicit faith, in order to be receptive to what is given in that, which 
manifests itself as fully secular. Therefore, modern philosophy should turn 
out to be the indispensable conversation partner for theology, because it 
perceptively and descriptively gathers experiences and expressions that 
might not immediately manifest themselves as responses or confessions of 
a giving and self-revealing God, but will in the end.
 28 Schillebeeckx, Church, pp. 65–66.
